The question du jour in Washington, DC posits, “What is the winning strategy for Afghanistan?” Yet, on February 8, 2009, President Obama articulated that Afghan policy as one to “creating sustainable security to try to prevent the Taliban from extending their grip on the country, going beyond military capacity to dealing with good governance, judicial reform, a focus on the police, and the war on "winning hearts, minds and stomachs" of the populace.[1]

 

As President Obama and his policy, military and political advisers review and deliberate the February 8, 2009 strategic policy statement he advanced for winning in Afghanistan, on September 29, 2009, the pundits couched the review as one limited to three questions; namely:

1.            How many troops will General McChrystal need?

2.            How long will the troops stay in Afghanistan before their mission is accomplished?

3.            Accomplish what mission?

 

These are all pertinent and relevant questions, but before these questions can be effectively addressed, a more fundamental and perhaps crucial one must be answered.  Historical reality, and not coincidence, has dubbed Afghanistan “The graveyard of empires”.  The terrain is treacherous and hostile, life is frozen in time, poverty is a way of life, and institutions of governance are rudimentary and worst of all the state has no effective de facto control over most of the country. In some parts, law and order, as we know it, is foreign and in conflict with tribal law. All previous attempts to conquer Afghanistan failed because of a basic failure to comprehend these Afghan characteristics.

 

Of course the United States is not an empire and has no occupation designs or any form of hegemony over that country. Yes, by necessity, the United States must ensure that Afghanistan is never again governed by any group that is sympathetic to Al-Qaida, affiliate organizations or radical elements of the Taliban. As such, the primary objective in the formulation of a robust winning strategy for Afghanistan, should be whether the United States is prepared, irrespective of costs, financial and human sacrifice to commit itself to transform, albeit in a limited scope, Afghanistan from its present rustic 16^th Century state to a twenty-first Century modern nation with the prerequisite institutions of governance and security apparatus capable of exercising its sovereignty over all of its territory without resort to some form of nation building?

 

Only the answer to this question will lead to addressing the scope of the resources; number of troops; material etc., needed by General McChrystal to eliminate the insurgency [2], the length of the mission and the definition of that mission. A necessary element to the fire power is creating sustainable security, which means train and deploy Afghan troops, paramilitary and police in the hundred of thousands to project and protect its sovereignty and security in all corners of the country. Such an effective security blanket would not only deny Al-Qaida and the raddicalTaliban a safe haven in Afghanistan, but will also limit their mobility from Pakistan. Furthermore, for every one thousand combat soldiers, append ten civilians to work on training and coordinating local groups on "winning hearts, minds and stomachs" of the populace.

 

 

The right strategy is already in place, the challenge now is to develop an informed answer to the core and controlling question of coupling that strategy with some form of nation building. A winning strategy for Afghanistan and some form of nation building are not mutually exclusive, but rather complementary. Therefore, given the monumental impact of this decision on his presidency, the President is correct in taking as much time as necessary to cogitate on the various options proffered. In the final analysis, the decision is his and his alone. However, we discern certain key components that permit the implementation of the objective to ensure that Afghanistan is never again governed by any group that is sympathetic to Al-Qaida, affiliate organizations or radical elements of the Taliban.

 

First, President Obama should reject out right any recommendation that advocates a piece meal approach because it implies dithering.

 

Second, President Obama should give the field commanders everything requested with the prime directive to them to render every cave, valley, hill, mountain and inch of Afghanistan territory hell for the insurgency.

Let there be no tawdry claim tomorrow that he failed "our troops" when he sent them in harms way undermanned despite the field commanders requests. Direct the commanders to erect a combat ready Afghan security force within three years. Instruct the State Department to assemble a trained robust civilian component to assist in the development of institutions of governance and to train and coordinate local groups to assist in "winning hearts, minds and stomachs" of the people. In short, the radical Taliban and Al-Qaida should be made irrelevant.

 

Third, President Obama must unequivocally demand and insist that whoever wins the presidential elections in Afghanistan must constitute a truly government of national unity. The aim here being to create or at least lay the foundation for a political settlement. As long as the people lack trust in their own government, any effort on the part of the United States and the international community will not yield the desired outcome. The government and by extension the people of Afghanistan should be able to take over the protection of their own security within five years.

 

Fourth, President Obama should remind the international community the tragedy that is Afghanistan occurred because the world did not react in unison when the radical Taliban and Al-Qaida ruthlessly took over Afghanistan. Now, the world and not just the United States must ensure in words and deeds that Afghanistan is never again governed by any group that is sympathetic to Al-Qaida, affiliate organizations or radical elements of the Taliban.

 

Fifth and finally, President Obama should explain the rationale behind this strategy to the American people by laying out the high stakes and consequences of failure. Americans and the world, for that matter, should be under no illusion that if history repeats itself in Afghanistan this time, we will be fighting a multitude of similar battles around the globe with perhaps dire consequences. Lest we forget, if only we had paid attention when Al-Qaeda initially started its campaign of indiscriminate mayhem, just maybe, we would not be engaged in an Afghanistan war. President Obama should make the case for the link between the long term national security interests of the United States and the soundness of his decision. For example, the Afghan war is a fight to prevent having to be fighting the Taliban in Pakistan, with perhaps nuclear weapons?

 

Simon W Tache

 

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[1] US strategy will focus on 'winning hearts, minds and stomachs' http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/feb/08/obama-afghanistan-us-foreign-policy

[2] “The problem in Afghanistan isn't necessarily a quantitative manpower problem but rather a manpower distribution problem.” Winning in Afghanistan: A military analyst on what's wrong with U.S. strategy. By Dan Ephron | Newsweek Web Exclusive, http://www.newsw eek.com/id/160439. Given the vast size of the country and its unforgiving terrain, Professor Thomas Johnson is correct regarding the distribution problem, but that too is necessarily tied to the number of troops.

 

 

 

Brief Review of the Factual Context

As the stand-off between the ousted president, Manuel Zelaya and the interim government led by Roberto Micheletti in Honduras generates much debate, the arguments have gone from the rational[1] to the absurd[2]. An overview of the brief history of the origin of the Honduras constitutional crisis dates back to January 2006 when Manuel Zelaya was inaugurated president of Honduras. His four-year term in office would expire January 27, 2010.  As such, presidential elections were scheduled for November 29, 2009. Under Article 239 of the Honduras Constitution, presidents are limited to one term in office and under Article 4 of the Constitution, anyone who attempts to change the term limit provision is guilty of the crime of treason.

The November 29, 2009 elections, as originally scheduled, did not include any ballot on constitutional amendment. Under Article 373 any constitutional amendment must be decreed by two-thirds vote of the National Congress.  However, having failed in the fall of 2008, to win congressional approval for a “referendum to amend the constitution”, President Zelaya issued a decree directing the National Statistical Institute to carry out a “non-binding consultation survey". Arguably, the purpose of the consultation survey, was to explore the feasibility of introducing the so called “consultation ballot box” in order to determine if the voters would like to include a referendum to amend the constitution during the November 29, 2009 elections.  The November 29, 2009 elections would have had only three ballot boxes for president, Congress, and local officials. Hence, the designation of the consultation survey as the “fourth ballot box”.[3] 

The Honduras Supreme Court, the Congress, and the National Electoral Tribunal all declared the consultation survey illegal, not having been approved by Congress as required under the constitution. Yet, president Zelaya ordered the military to provide logistical assistance in support of the consultation ballot. When the military refused to disobey an order of the Honduras Supreme Court, President Zelaya fired the joint chief of staff of the Armed Forces, notwithstanding that under Article 279 of the Constitution the Armed Forces Chief can only be removed by the Congress.

. The army chief was later reinstated by the Supreme Court, which ordered him to confiscate the ballot materials.  The president allegedly went with a crowd to military barracks to reclaim the ballots and vowed to continue with the November 29, 2009 "consultation survey ballot."  According to official reports, on June 26, 2009 the Supreme Court issued an order authorizing the military to arrest the president.  The military entered the home of president Zelaya the morning of June 28, 2009 and apparently decided on their own to exile him rather than detain him in Honduras. The national Congress then unanimously approved the removal of president Zelaya and elected the head of the Congress, Roberto Micheletti, as interim president to fulfill the remainder of the term to January 2010.[4]

Protagonists Claims of Cover under the Constitution of Honduras

The current Constitution of the Republic of Honduras was approved on January 11, 1982 and has since been amended twenty-two times, almost on a yearly basis. The 1987 version of the Constitution of Honduras provides for a strong executive, a unicameral National Congress, and a Judiciary appointed by the National Congress. Although the Judiciary is appointed by the single chamber legislature, the Judiciary is said to be independent of the executive and the legislative branches of government. Consequently, the crisis facing the people of Honduras is in most respects a turf war, with each branch of government trying to assert and protect its constitutional authority.

Both sides to the Honduras constitutional crisis have invoked constitutional cover to support their actions and to couch their arguments. Accordingly, we accept as controlling the pertinent language of that constitution even though the constitution itself has varied, and sometimes conflicting articles on effectuating constitutional change.  Under that document, popular referenda may be used to modify the constitution, but the referenda must first be approved by Congress.  Concurrently, the Congress can modify the constitution directly.  We read the congressional approval of any proposed referendum and direct authority to amend the constitution requirements as giving congress primary authority over constitutional amendments matters. As such, the National Congress has the authority to invalidate a presidential decree. Seven provisions of the constitution are immutable, sacrosanct and can never be changed. Those provisions include; the form of government, the term of president, and the prohibition on presidential reelection. Furthermore, anyone who attempts to change these permanent constitutional clauses would immediately lose their official position and citizenship if convicted in a Court of law. 

The proposed consultation survey did not violate the Honduras Constitution

On June 26, 2009, the Supreme Court of Honduras issued an order for President Zelaya’s arrest, and published a communiqué  explaining its decision. According to the Court, Zelaya had violated Article 239 of the Honduras Constitution, which forbids a president from seeking to serve more than one term in office. The Court further elaborated that under the provision of Article 239, any president who seeks to amend or alter this constitutional limitation is to be removed from office.

However, an examination of Article 239 shows that to arrive at its conclusion, the Court invariably accepted as facts, assumptions which it imputed to Zelaya’s state of mind. True, Article 239 of the constitution prohibits a “president from seeking to amend or alter this constitutional term limitation” The consultation survey was not a referendum to change the presidential term limit, but rather "Do you think that the November 29, 2009 general elections should include a fourth ballot box in order to make a decision about the creation of a National Constitutional Assembly that would approve a new Constitution?" The consultation survey deliberately does not state with specificity the nature or form of the constitutional amendment or new constitution envisioned. One cannot say unequivocally that the only intended purpose of the consultation survey was to change presidential term limit. In fact, to make that quantum leap, one must profess to know president Zelaya’s mind and intentions. The Court may be absolutely correct in its inference, but for its decision to command legitimacy it must not be based on conjecture.

Of course, president Zelaya knew that both the Court and congress were opposed to any change to the constitutional mandated term limit. As one writer has pointed out, sic “it is not the act which has been deemed illegal; it is the process which Mr. Zelaya chose to follow. This is a "non-binding" referendum that would determine whether or not there would be an additional urn at the November elections where voters could state whether or not they would like a new constitution and also to allow the re-election of the president. If the result of the referendum was "yes," there would be voting on those two issues. Period. It would not be debated; it would be a fait accompli. A case of "Heads I win, tails you lose." How non-binding is that?” Thus, it can be argued that the consultation was an attempt to use popular support to circumvent the constitution. We are not unmindful of the parallelism between Zelaya’s tactics and the approach employed by President Chavez in Venezuela. However, until such time as president Zelaya has made a direct and overt effort to alter the term limit, no constitutional violation has occurred. In fact, this situation is analogous to charging and convicting a person for saying he is going to burglarize a store and all he does is ask the shop keeper “what time is the store alarm armed?”

 President Zelaya actions did violate Honduran law

Although we have conclude that it cannot be said unequivocally that the consultation survey put forth by president Zelaya was tantamount to an act to change presidential term limit and therefore not violative of Article 239 of the Honduras Constitution, we opine that his actions violated Honduran Law. As chief executive officer of the nation, he is under the stringent of obligations to uphold the law. President Zelaya knew his four-year term in office would expire on January 27, 2010.  He was also very aware that the November 29, 2009 elections would not include any ballot on constitutional amendment since he had failed in the Fall of 2008 to win congressional approval for a “referendum to amend the constitution”. As is often the case with dictatorial tendencies, President Zelaya issued a decree directing the National Statistical Institute to carry out a non-binding consultation survey. The mere issuance of this decree was a direct violation of the Order of the Honduras Supreme Court. Not surprisingly, the Congress, Honduras Supreme Court and the National Electoral Tribunal all declared that the consultation survey was illegal, not having been approved by Congress.

Notwithstanding the invalidation of the proposed “consultation survey” by the country’s Supreme Court, President Zelaya nevertheless ordered the military to provide logistical assistance in support the consultation ballot. When the military refused to disobey an order of the Supreme Court, President Zelaya fired the joint chief of staff of the Armed Forces. We are cognizant of the assertion by some that the Honduran Supreme Court is "one of the most corrupt institutions in Latin America”[5] Given that the judges are appointed by the legislature, it is more likely than not that the judges would favor the legislative over the executive branch in a given constitutional dispute. However, on the basis of the facts on which the Honduran constitutional crisis is grounded, the Honduran Supreme Court properly exercised its role as a co-protector of the Honduran Constitution. Clear violations of the Court order by the chief law enforcement officer of the country were inconsistent with Honduran law and carry with it the appropriate sanctions or consequences imposed by the Court. Regrettably, during the enforcement of the Court’s Order, the military, in concert with either the judiciary or legislature, or both, or on its own accord, acted in a manner that many have described as a coup d’état.

 The use of the military to remove president Zelaya No Coup d’état

On June 26, 2009, the Honduras Supreme Court issued an order for the military to arrest president Zelaya.  Pursuant to and acting within the authority of that order, the military entered president Zelaya’s home the morning of June 28, 2009 and seized him. Instead of taking him to a detention facility in Honduras, the officers, allegedly, on their own accord decided to exile him[6]. The national Congress then unanimously approved the removal of Zelaya and elected the head of the Congress, Roberto Micheletti, as interim president to fulfill the remainder of the term to January 2010. Since the Honduran Constitution has no provision for impeachment of a president who has violated the law, the Honduras Congress lacked the constitutional authority to impeach president Zelaya. Unfortunately, during the enforcement of the Court’s Order, the military, in concert with either or both the judiciary and/or legislature acted in a manner that has led many to describe the crisis as a coup d’état. Hence, the general view that president Zelaya must be return to the office of the presidency.

A coup d’état is a sudden, unconstitutional and an organized action by the armed forces of a country to overthrow a legitimate government. Under the salient facts of this crisis, we are not persuaded the military officers ordered to arrest president Zelaya, on their own initiative, removed the president from the country. We also find it incredulous that the military officers involved unilaterally decided to exile Zelaya in Costa Rica without directives or intervention from the interim regime. There is no evidence to conclude that the military acted on its own initiative. In fact, they were enforcing an order of the country’s highest Court with competent jurisdiction. There is not now or at any time during the crisis control of the civilian administration by the military[7]. On the contrary, the military is under civilian control. As such, the admission by the Honduran military officers that they acted beyond the scope of the Court’s arrest warrant by removing and improperly expelling president Zelaya to Costa Rica constitutes a violation of the due process requirements of Article 239 of the Honduran Constitution. The violation of the due process requirements is not impugned to the military, but rather to the interim government. Therefore, the use of the military to remove president Zelaya from office pursuant to the Honduras Supreme Court Order was not a coup d’état. Accordingly, the cover that both sides seek from the constitution is unavailable to either since they both acted in a manner inconsistent with the spirit of the Honduran constitution and violated Honduras law.

Current Mediation efforts are not Interference in Honduras Internal Affairs.

Carlos Lopez, acting Honduran foreign minister and a member of the Micheletti delegation, said that “Arias’s negotiations proposals were unacceptable.”  In explaining the position of the interim government, he continued; “The mediation has been unable to understand that the intention to reinstate Zelaya goes against Honduran law,” and “constitutes an open interference in the internal affairs of Honduras.” The fallacy of this position is that when the interim government sanctioned the military exile of president Zelaya on June 28, 2009, it converted what would have been an internal affair into an international one. Accordingly, the principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of Honduras does not apply and the efforts of the Organization of American States, the United Nations, and Costa Rica’s President Oscar Arias are not only proper but necessary to protect Honduras’ national sovereignty and Constitutional form of government.

Breaking the Negotiations impasse

Having concluded that both sides to the constitutional crisis cannot avail themselves of the constitutional cover because they both acted in a manner inconsistent with the spirit of the Honduras constitution and violated Honduras law, it stands to reason that any negotiated settlement must account for this crucial and non remedial defect. On July 22, 2009, Costa Rican President Oscar Arias[8] presented an updated proposal to end the Honduran constitutional crisis. The proposed agreement, to be effective, must recognize the legal position that both parties acted in a manner inconsistent with the spirit of the Honduran constitution and in violation of Honduras law. Therefore, to be meaningful and constructive the “San Jose Accord” should provide for:

1.                   Zelaya’s return to power, simply for purposes of compliance with Honduras Constitution, but immediately within 72 hours resign as president of Honduras and agree not to hold any public office for ten (10) years;

2.                   Concurrently, the interim president Micheletti should also resign and agree not to be a presidential candidate for the November 29, 2009 elections;

3.                   A new interim president should be appointed as per the constitution to head a government that includes all political groups;

4.                    Provide total and unconditional amnesty for all parties involved;

5.                    Presidential elections should be held on  November 29, 2009 as scheduled;

6.                   The military to be under the control of Honduras’s elections regulators for one month before the presidential vote;

7.                    The creation of an international commission to oversee implementation of the agreement;

8.                   The creation of a truth commission to investigate the events that led to the crisis; and

9.                   Provide for a firm timeline for the implementation of the accord.

We believe this approach will ensure the integrity of the constitutional process and allow the people of Honduras to move forward by electing a new president as previously scheduled on November 29, 2009 elections[9]. The two people, Zelaya and Micheletti, claiming legitimacy over the presidency despite their unlawful conduct should have nothing whatsoever to do with the November 29, 2009 elections of a new government.

The Political debate over enhanced interrogation techniques or torture

Since December 6, 2007 when published reports began to circulate publicly that the CIA recorded hundreds of hours of interrogations of Abu Zubaydah and Abd al Rashim al Nashiri during 2002, there has been and continue to dominate the political scene the debate over who knew what and when?  On Thursday, May 7, 2009, Intelligence officials leaked documents to the Washington Post and ABC News to show that, contrary to her public pronouncements, Speaker, Nancy Pelosi was privy to the use of torture against the detainees’ enemy combatants.

The ten-page memorandum, however, makes no specific reference to water boarding, but appear to imply that Speaker Pelosi, at the time the most senior Democrat on the House Intelligence Committee, received a secret briefing in September 2002 on the enhanced interrogation techniques used on detainees, including interrogation of Abu Zubaydah[1]. The Speaker, however, vehemently maintains that "We were told that water boarding was not being used," the speaker said. "That's the only mention, that they were not using it. And we now know that earlier they were."  Her office reiterated that she had never been briefed about the use of water boarding — only that it had been approved in abstract terms by Bush Administration lawyers as a technique for interrogations.

In defending the CIA against House Speaker Pelosi's charge that she was misled in 2002 about the use of water boarding, the new Director of the agency said, “"Let me be clear. It is not our policy or practice to mislead Congress,"[2]  At first it would appear that there is a discrepancy between what Speaker Pelosi said in her statement and the conveniently[3] leaked memorandum by the Intelligence officials. Yet, on closer examination, both parties are correct in their asserted positions. To appreciate the correctness of the positions of Speaker Pelosi and the CIA Director, we turn to the work of the 911 Commission.

Although the Commission was not investigating the treatment of detainees, the Commission did make broad initial requests for intelligence information from interrogations, specifically including Zubaydah and Nashiri from the CIA, DOD, and the FBI[4]. From the Commission’s initial document request for “interrogation material (DCI Document Request No. 4 filed on June 6, 2003)” to meetings on September 22 and September 25, 2003 with the agencies, Commission staffers established that interrogations were turned into written reports, first through “operational cables” sent to reports officers and then the reports officers wrote up the material for dissemination to the intelligence community.” According to the Commission staff, they were repeatedly assured that there was no material or substantive differences between the information contained in the operational cables and the information in the disseminated reports. The implication being that “any gaps in the reports would not be solved by consulting the operational cables”[5]

Indeed, as late as January 26, 2004 meeting, none of the government officials involved alluded to or confirmed the existence of recordings of interrogations or any further information in the government’s possession that was relevant to the Commission’s requests.[6]  Unfortunately, these recordings are reported to have been destroyed in November 2005[7] As such, available information is insufficient to resolve questions involving the “credibility and meaning of the interrogation reports”. These concerns were eventually highlighted in a text box in the Commission report (p. 146).[8]

Thus, it is very conceivable that relying only on the information contained in the operational cables and the information in the disseminated reports, the CIA truthfully stated that enhanced interrogation techniques were use with respect to certain detainees without specifically providing any detail on the scope of the specific elements of those techniques. Since the information contained in the operational cables and the information in the disseminated reports do not specify which detainees were the recipients of which specific elements of the enhancement interrogation techniques, Speaker Pelosi would be correct in asserting that she was not briefed on water boarding in September 2002. Now if it turns out that the water boarding technique was already being used, then it is not totally inconceivable that she would feel misled.  As such, under these facts, anyone calling for the resignation of the Speaker, either does not understand an obvious distinction between the information contained in the disseminated reports and information contained in the actual recordings of interrogations, or is suffering from the political blinders that often emerge when policy and law collide.

These seemingly contradictory positions are the product of the manner in which the enhanced interrogation techniques debate has been framed. The inability of some to appreciate the distinction between the information contained in the disseminated reports and information contained in the actual recordings of interrogations which has led them to frame the current political discourse on the enhanced interrogation techniques policy debate as one of knowledge, i.e. as “who knew what and when?” begs the question. We know that enhanced interrogation techniques were initiated, developed, adopted and authorized by the Bush Administration. Although there is an allegation that then Attorney General, Gonzales, may not have taken into consideration the majority legal opinion on whether these or some elements of these techniques were legal, the fact remains that they were approved and portrayed as legal by the Bush Administration. Thus, those called upon to implement the techniques would have had to rely on their legality. Moreover, even if the recordings of interrogations exist, we could not now afford to accuse them of following the directives they deemed legal in the course of performing their duties on behalf of the nation.

Similarly, any suggestion that the lawyers who drafted the legal opinions used in support of the enhanced interrogation techniques should be prosecuted because their opinions were not exhaustive or incorrect is misplaced. Even assuming that these lawyers did not consider all of the relevant and applicable law, the most that can be said of their conduct is negligence or analogous to a violation of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, but that conduct does not rise to the level of criminality. Moreover, the Attorney General did not have to accept and/or use their opinions. Indeed, former Attorney General Gonzalez could have overrule every lawyer involved in drafting the opinions and they would have no recourse. Ironically, those same legal opinions will insulate Attorney General Gonzales.

We also know that the enhanced interrogation techniques were used because former Vice President Cheney has said so in many words. On Face the Nation with Bob Schieffer on May 10, 2009, the following exchange took place.

“SCHIEFFER: Well, but why does that make the country less safe? You’re talking about -- you say you don’t think we ought to be going back and questioning those people, looking into some of these things. All right, I take your point on that, but how is that making the country less safe? How does that make the country more vulnerable to an attack in the future?

CHENEY: Well, at the heart of what we did with the terrorist surveillance program and the enhanced interrogation techniques for Al Qaida terrorists and so forth was collect information. It was about intelligence. It was about finding out what Al Qaida was going to do, what their capabilities and plans were. It was discovering all those things we needed in order to be able to go defeat Al Qaida”.[9]

We further know that a senior Pentagon official in the Bush administration’s system for prosecuting detainees said in a published interview that she had concluded that interrogators had tortured a Guantánamo detainee who has sometimes been described as “the 20th hijacker” in the 2001 terrorist attacks.[10]  According to the official, “interrogating him with techniques that included sustained isolation, sleep deprivation, nudity and prolonged exposure to cold, leaving him in a "life-threatening condition." is torture.

Thus, to couch the debate as one of “who knew what and when” is merely a diversionary tactic calculated to score political points rather than address the real issue at stake. In the final analysis, the firestorm engendered by the policy that led to the torture of the detainees’ debate would eviscerate into a simple question of whom, if any, misled congress? The nation has already decided and rejected this policy as un-American and wrong. We believe, at this point in time, the relevant inquiry should focus on determining whether any official deliberately withheld any information during the congressional briefings which he or she knew or should have known would mislead Congress about the time and use of water boarding or torture on any of the detainees by any interrogator.

In this respect, there are applicable statutes that penalizes anyone who “knowingly and willfully … conceals, or covers up” a “material fact” in such an investigation or makes “any materially false” statement or representation to the investigating agency.[11] The debate over the torture of certain enemy combatants while in the custody of the United States is a necessary and perhaps required catharsis for a nation trying to rid itself of the ghosts of a rejected policy. Whichever way this debate plays out, one thing is clear, no governmental official involved in the development, authorization and subsequent use of the “enhanced interrogation techniques” will ever be convicted in a court of law for anything[12], but knowingly lying or deliberately withholding information about the existence, or destruction of documents that unequivocally show a contradiction in statements made regarding the authorization and use of these techniques.

The initial position taken by President Obama on the subject is the correct one.

Simon W Tache

 ___________________________________________________________________

                                    WHAT IS YOUR OPINION?

Is the African Union missing out on a golden opportunity to establish credibility and assume a leadership role in the response to the daily acts of piracy against international shipping in and off the coast of Somalia?

In expressing your opinion, let us remind you that with respect to activities and/or policies of collective concern, or in respect to acts of grave circumstances, the African Union commands supreme sovereign authority over the national sovereignty of the individual member states. Specifically, Article 4 of the African Union Constitutive Act provides that “the African Union shall function in accordance with the following principles:

4(h) “the right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity;”

4(j) the right of Member States to request intervention from the Union in order to restore peace and security.

Today, the international community and specifically the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia are being called upon to take any action deemed necessary to prevent and suppress acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships originating from within Somalia and to ensure that the coastline of Somalia does not become a safe haven from which attacks are launched. This action is not only necessary, but imperative for the protection of international shipping, an activity of collective international concern. Unfortunately, the "grave circumstances, engendered by these acts of piracy, (estimated at 40% of all world wide attacks in 2008), taking place on a daily basis in and off the coast of Somalia, are but the symptoms of a much larger malaise within the country of Somalia.

If the piracy pandemic is to be eradicated, shouldn’t the root cause be removed? The interdiction actions of the international anti-piracy task force, as a temporary bandage is useful and necessary. However, to eliminate acts of piracy originating from Somalia, that nation must assert its sovereignty, and  request and receive the resources necessary to establish law and order in all of its territory. Here is where the African Union can take a leadership role.

  Simon W Tache

I.       The Problem with Africa

On October 15, 2000, when I was first asked to discuss Democracy and Child labor in Africa, I immediately recalled an Article entitled “Hopeless Africa” in the May 2000 Issue of The Economist.[1]  Contemporaneously, on July 11, 2000, in Lome, Togo, the governments of African nations adopted the Constitutive Act creating the African Union.[2] In the juxtaposition of these two events, it suddenly dawn on me that the apocalyptic opinions on Africa rely on the symptoms; while the heads of states of African nations have just taken a very concrete step to address the root cause of the “problem with Africa”.   Finally, there is a constitutive document that establishes a blue print for the foundation for the cure to the problem with Africa, absence of institutional political maturity. 

In order to appreciate the magnitude of the problem with Africa, suffice to point out that Africa is compose of fifty three (53) states, the  second largest of the Earth's seven continents, and covers 30,244,000 sq km (11,677,000 sq mi), including its adjacent islands.  Africa comprises of 23 percent of the world's total land area, boasts of approximately 15 percent of the world's population, an estimated 800 million people, making it the world's second most populous continent, behind only Asia. Africa is a very rich continent and is a major producer of some of the world's most demanded minerals and precious metals, such as gold, diamonds, copper, and coltan (used in computer chips and other electronics); as well as, coal, oil, natural gas and timber.[3] Yet, despite the magnitude of its wealth, Africa continues to be economically and politically distressed.

Every continent, at some point in its history, has gone through turbulent times, but the apocalyptic argue that the “problem with Africa” seems to be perpetual and self sustaining. These protagonists equate Africa with everything bad about the human condition on earth. No wonder Africa is often associated with misfortunes, calamities and bad headline news[4] rather than its positive contribution to the sustainability of so many. Indeed, one writer recently said, “Is there any hope for Africa? Not in the foreseeable future. Like much of the Middle East, it is a pestilent sinkhole of disease, war, famine, and death. The Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse are quite at home in Africa.”[5]  To be sure, most of these assertions portend some validity and a look at the laundry list, that is the problem with Africa, makes for a compelling case for the doom Sayers.

A.       Internal and External Constraints

          The problem with Africa is often described in terms of “internal and external” forces at work. Amongst the internal forces; include, corruption which dates to the Post-Colonial era. As the political orphans that they were following independence, most public servants saw and still resort to bribery as a means to self sustenance and escape poverty. Successive leaders have been accused of diverting public funds and profits from the private sector into their personal Swiss bank accounts.  Although natural disasters are a common occurrence, they take on an unnatural persona when they occur in Africa. Each disaster whether internal or external seems to reaffirm the apocalyptic view that Africa is a magnet for natural as well as man made disasters.

1.       Internal Constraints

First, there were the military coups of the 1970s, then the civil wars and related conflicts that have culminated in genocides in Rwanda, some parts of the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Darfur in Sudan. These man made disasters are often associated with racism and ethnicity. Some have even argued that tribal or ethnic discord is at the root of the conflicts that have ripped the continent. As evidence, the apocalyptic protagonists point to the rush to purchase weapons such as guns, grenades, bombs, and ammunition by some Africans to kill and maim others. Congo, Ethiopia, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan and Zaire, are cited as examples of cases in which whole population were exposed to starvation to death and destruction. These cases shock the conscience and defy any logical explanation that other human beings were capable of perpetrating these horrendous acts.

Another internal factor contributing to the problem with Africa is infectious diseases such as malaria, tuberculosis and Aids. Infectious diseases have crippled African efforts to achieve economic self-sufficiency for a very long time. By some estimates, African nations spend billions of dollars each year to contain these diseases.[6] Eradicate these diseases it is argued and those resources can be redirected towards economic and social developments. Is there then any surprise that Africa's leaders find themselves in the catch 22 of internal social and political dynamics and the external pressures of the outside world?

Lack of leadership is often cited as one of Africa’s ailments. The argument postulates that African leaders tend to take complete control of their countries and run them as personal fiefdoms. In their efforts to consolidate power and subdue any perceived threat, whether real or not, these leaders resort to absolute rule in an attempt to create the personality cult. Conversely, economic benefits are directed at supporters of the regimes while creating no permanent or consistent pattern of development or advancement of the wellbeing of the general population. Mozambique and Zimbabwe offer a contrasting perspective in this regard. Mozambique is often portrayed as a classic example of “a poor country which has made great strides since its civil war to introduce reforms and openness within public life.” Conversely, Zimbabwe has gone from the Pent House to political and economic disaster in a relatively short period of time.[7]

2.       External Constraints

External constraints of the problem with Africa include; colonialism, cold war, foreign debt, international economic forces of supply and demand and an ineffective United Nations in addressing the real challenges confronting Africa. True we cannot minimize the negative impact of colonialism on the slow pace of political and economic development in Africa, but after more than a half century of independence[8], this argument has lost its luster. Similarly, the cold war, during which the international community interest was directed by east-west political alignment, was universal in its application. Those African nations that depend on foreign aid for basic necessities, or carry disproportionate foreign debt in comparison to revenue returns from National Gross Product, are gravely affected. Hence, in recent years, the G20, formerly G8, countries have made a concerted effort to debt forgiveness in combination with aid assistance.[9] Granted these internal and external forces have played a role in the problem with Africa, but are they the root cause?

B.       Absence of Institutional Political Maturity

A casual review of both the internal and external factors, often advanced as justification of the problem with Africa, reveals that these factors are not unique to Africa. Indeed, these factors are not inherently an African phenomenon, but universally affect all continents. There is not a single continent that in the course of its history has not have to deal with foreign debt, corruption, disease, natural disasters, and civil wars. The difference is that other continents are able to confront and address these challenges while Africa has consistently failed. These internal and external factors have a common denominator; they are symptoms and not the root cause of the problem with Africa. The simple reason for the failure of Africa, to effectively and consistently confront and address these internal and external constraints, is directly linked to the absence of institutional political maturity, and not lack, of political will as is often suggested.

Zimbabwe is a case in point. Not long ago, Zimbabwe was being touted as illustrative of political success in Africa. Recently, Zimbabwe has failed not because of the lack of political will, but because of the absence of institutional political maturity. For decades, the majority of African leaders, past and present, have exercised political will to monopolize power. In the process, an undesirable consequence is the creation of the vacuum, known as “absence of established or institutional political maturity”. These leaders have long recognized that the presence of institutional political maturity invariably means short lived political careers and attendant benefits. As such, they allocated very little effort to the creation of institutions that support institutionalized political maturity, which in turn allow political will to be directed according to the rule of law.

The presence of institutional political maturity is often accompanied by the creation of a constitutional form of government, where the three branches; the legislature, executive and judiciary are coequal branches, based on the principle of the separation of powers to maintain check and balances.[10] From that constitutional construct are erected permanent and effective institutions of governance that allow the people, and not an individual, to develop sound decision-making processes that address internal and external constraints as those discussed above. The presence of institutionalized political maturity, therefore, is not only the catalyst, but central to achieving democratic institutions and governance.[11]  

          President Mugabe was acutely aware that the absence of institutionalized political maturity is a continental malaise when he said, [sic] “let any African leader with clean hands speak out against me” Sadly enough in a continent of 53 countries, not more than three voiced any open condemnation of Mugabe’s undemocratic actions.[12] I recall vividly watching a tear gas canister; fired at protesters following the Kenyan presidential election, strike Zain Verjee, a news correspondent, at CNN[13] and shortly thereafter, a number of Zimbabweans with sticks and machetes chasing fellow citizens on foot through neighborhoods because they support the opposition party.[14]

These moments, indelibly inscribed in our consciousness, give credence to the “problem with Africa”. No, Africa has the political will, unfortunately, that political will has not been properly directed towards creating or enabling the presence of institutional political maturity. The constant tension between political will and absence of the elusive “institutional political maturity” explains the lack of permanent democratic institutions and governance in Africa. The first attempt by African leaders to convert political will into institutionalized political maturity can be traced to the Organization of African Unity,[15]  [OAU] in 1963.